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I. INTRODUCTION
There is an art to the game of Blackjack. The rules are fixed, and while lady luck
surely plays her role, the rules and odds are well known to a wise player before he
places his bet on the green felt table-top. But what if one day the dealer changed the
rules in the middle of the game? What if the dealer simply declared that any
combination of cards it dealt to itself equaled twenty-one? No doubt, the player
would cry foul, and with good and honest reason. “Rules are rules,” says the player,
trying to reason with the dealer. The player opens his rulebook to show the dealer
that there is no such rule. Then, to add insult to injury, the dealer simply declares
that he has always had this power, only he had forgotten it for several years. The
dealer explains that his power transcends the rulebook. Does this situation seem
fair?
Unfortunately, this story’s parallel is occurring today in many federal district
courts with a “rediscovered” use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21.1 Recently,
federal district courts have held that Federal Rule 21 bestows upon them the power
to sever nondiverse parties or claims to create diversity jurisdiction without first
finding that a party or claim is improperly joined.2 Severance may mean that a
plaintiff who brings a state court action against multiple parties, one or more of
which is not diverse, runs the risk of a federal court severing the action in a removal
analysis, even where the plaintiff has committed no improper joinder of parties.
Severance may leave a plaintiff with the need to conduct simultaneous suits—one in
state court and one in federal court. Other federal district courts, however, have
correctly declined to sever properly joined nondiverse parties.3
1
See Laura J. Hines & Steven S. Gensler, Driving Misjoinder: The Improper Party
Problem in Removal Jurisdiction, 57 ALA. L. REV. 779, 824 (2006).
2

See Safeco Ins. Co. v. City of White House, 36 F.3d 540, 545 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Rule 21
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a district court to retain diversity jurisdiction
over a case by dropping a nondiverse party if that party’s presence in the action is not required
. . . .”); Joseph v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 868, 872 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (“I can retain
jurisdiction by severing claims against nondiverse dispensable defendants.”); DeGidio v.
Centocor, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-721, 2009 WL 1867676, at *4 (N.D. Ohio June 29, 2009);
Williams v. Knoll Pharm. Co., No. 5:03-CV-8030, at *6 (N.D. Ohio July 11, 2003) (PACER)
(“Rule 21 applies to the dismissal of properly joined parties as well as misjoined parties.”).
3
See Hughes v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 2:09-CV-93, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82550
(N.D. W. Va. Sept. 2, 2009) (requiring a finding of misjoinder before utilizing Federal Rule
21 to sever claims); Ash v. Providence Hosp., No. 08-0525-WS-M, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12794, at *44 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 17, 2009) (declining to sever parties because of the court’s
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Through an analysis of the purposes and limitations of removal and the proper
role of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rule”), this Note concludes
that the use of Federal Rule 21 to create diversity jurisdiction where all parties are
properly joined is improper. Parts III and IV of this Note review the qualifiers
necessary for diversity jurisdiction, the history and parameters of removal, and the
judicial doctrines of fraudulent joinder and procedural misjoinder. Parts V and VI
demonstrate that the misuse of Federal Rule 21 to create diversity jurisdiction in
removal actions where parties are properly joined has been supported by either a
misreading of or an unwarranted extension of the Supreme Court’s holding in
Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain,4 a disregard for the proper role of the
Federal Rules in relation to the interplay of judicial exercise and Congressional
oversight, and by ignoring the unfair consequences that misuse of the Rule places on
the parties to the action.
Arguably, such a misuse of Federal Rule 21 not only flouts the separation of
powers by treading into territory that Congress controls, but it also conflicts with the
self-limitations imposed by the Federal Rules themselves5 and can result in undue
hardship on plaintiffs.6 Part VII examines the possible solutions to the problem and
ultimately concludes that the best solution is for the judiciary to exercise selfrestraint in its application of Federal Rule 21. Alternatively, Congress could either
amend the removal or diversity statutes, or it could exercise its oversight powers
with regard to the Federal Rules themselves to remedy this misuse of Federal Rule
21.7
II. THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL RULE 21
A. The English Rules & The Judicature Acts
Originally, the English common law produced dismissal in most cases where
courts found misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties.8 This harsh effect, however, was
largely alleviated in the process of the codification of procedural rules.9 Codification
of civil procedure in the federal equity rules and the English rules of practice
allowed corrections to complaints to cure joinder defects where corrections would
produce no adverse effects on the parties to the action.10 The historical antecedent
“reluctance to manufacture federal jurisdiction via artificial means in a case where none exists
. . . .”); Etheridge v. Liberty Mut. Ins., No. 3:08CV004-SA-DS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67244,
at *9 (declining to sever under Federal Rule 21 where the court found no misjoinder); Culhane
Commc’ns v. Fuller, 489 F. Supp. 2d 959, 962 (D. S.D. 2007) (refusing to sever under Federal
Rule 21 where the court found no misjoinder of parties).
4

Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826 (1989).

5

See infra Parts VI.D-E.

6

See infra Part VI.E.

7

See Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965) (stating that Congress has a “longrecognized power . . . to prescribe . . . rules for federal courts . . . .”).
8

See 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1681 (3d ed.
2010).
9

See id.

10

See id.
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rule to Federal Rule 21 existed in the English procedural rules, later codified in The
Judicature Act of 1937.11 But even before the Judicature Acts, the rules of procedure
recognized that there were instances when parties or claims had been improperly
joined or omitted, and that judicial action may be necessary to add or drop one or
more parties or claims in the interest of efficient justice.12
The Common Law Procedure Act of 1852 discussed when claims and parties
were improperly joined under the heading of “Nonjoinder and Misjoinder.”13 In the
interest of efficiency, it was not necessary that every defendant joined in an action be
responsible for either the entire amount claimed by the plaintiff or every cause of
action.14 Courts and judges had the power to either drop misjoined parties and
claims or to order separate trials, but only if no injustice would result and only if the
party to be dropped were added to the action without her consent.15 The principle of
efficiency guided all early procedural rules. “[T]he sooner the parties get at the truth
of the matter the better for both of them, that it may end litigation . . . And . . . this
vital essence is infused into all civil procedure.”16 Therefore, then, as today, civil
procedure sought to maintain the spirit of efficiency; limited, however, by the
possibility of injustice to the parties.
The English Supreme Court Judicature Act of 1875, though it simplified the
language of the earlier acts, largely paralleled them in regard to dropping misjoined
claims and parties.17 Rule 13 of this Act continued the directive that a finding of
misjoinder was a necessary qualifier to exercising the judicial procedural power to
drop claims or parties.18 For instance, when two plaintiffs brought suit against a
11
See FED. R. CIV. P. 21, advisory committee’s note (citing English Rules Under the
Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 16 r. 11).
12

See The Common Law Procedure Act of 1852, O. XXXIV - XLI, reprinted in THE
COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACTS OF 1852, 1854, AND 1860 74-80 (W.F. Finlason ed., 1860).
13

See id.

14

See W.F. FINLASON, AN EXPOSITION OF OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND CIVIL PROCEDURE AS
RECONSTRUCTED UNDER THE JUDICATURE ACTS INCLUDING THE ACT OF 1876 WITH COMMENTS
ON THEIR EFFECT AND OPERATION 283 (1877). “And where in any action, whether founded
upon contract or otherwise, the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from whom he may be
entitled to redress, he may join two or more defendants, to the intent that in the action the
question as to which if any of them is liable, and to what extent, may be determined as
between all parties to the action.” Id.
15
THE COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACTS, supra note 12, at 74 (“It shall and may be lawful
for the court or judge . . . to order . . . any person[s] . . . originally joined as plaintiff[s] . . .
struck out . . . if it shall appear to such court or judge that injustice will not be done by such
amendment . . . and that the person[s] . . . to be struck out . . . were originally introduced
without his[] [or] her, or their consent . . . .”). The same rule applied to defendants. See id. at
77.
16

FINLASON, supra note 14, at 274.

17

See Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875, O. 16 r. 13, reprinted in THE NEW SYSTEM
PRACTICE AND PLEADING UNDER THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE ACTS, 1873, 1875,
1877, THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION ACT, 1876, AND THE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 463
(William Thos. Charley ed., 1877).

OF

18
Id. (“[A] Judge may, at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the
application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court or a Judge to be just,
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defendant company for polluting a stream for which both plaintiffs had an interest, 19
the judge proceeded as if the claims were separate, but only after finding that they
had been misjoined because the interest was not common between them.20 Rule 13
required misjoinder prior to the judge’s action of separating these claims. While
these English rules were statutorily created, the process for rule creation in America
today is guided by the judiciary.
B. American Rule Creation
While the Constitution grants Congress the power to prescribe procedural rules
for inferior federal courts,21 Congress, by enacting the Rules Enabling Act in 1934,22
delegated this power to the Supreme Court. Later, in 1958, Congress transferred the
bulk of rulemaking power from the Supreme Court to the Judicial Conference of the
United States.23 The Judicial Conference submits its rules to the Supreme Court for
approval, and Congress can either approve the rules or allow them to become law by
inaction.24 The enacted Federal Rules have “the force and effect” of law, and they
supersede prior inconsistent statutes.25
Since the passage of the Rules Enabling Act and the implementation of Federal
Rule 21, the rule-making process has trended away from Supreme Court
centralization and more toward a multi-layered and formalistic process.26 In 1958,
Congress required the Judicial Standing Committee to “carry on a continuous study
of the operation and effect” and to recommend “changes in and additions to those
rules as . . . desirable to promote simplicity . . . , fairness . . . , the just determination
of litigation, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.”27 Currently,
order that the . . . parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, improperly joined be struck
out . . . .”) (emphasis added).
19
See Appleton v. The Chapel Town Paper Co., 45 L.J. Ch. 276 (1877), reprinted in THE
NEW SYSTEM OF PRACTICE AND PLEADING UNDER THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE ACTS,
1873, 1875, 1877, THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION ACT, 1876, AND THE RULES OF THE SUPREME
COURT 463 (William Thos. Charley ed., 1877).
20

See id.

21

See U.S. CONST. art III, § 1; U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.

22

Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified in current form at 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 2071-77 (West 2010)).
23

See A Brief History of the Federal Rulemaking Process, THE THIRD BRANCH
(Newsletter of the Federal Courts, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2009, at 7, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/TTBViewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/News/TTB/
archive/2009-10%20Oct.pdf?page=7.
24

See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2074, 2075 (West 2010).

25

See Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 656 (1996) (“In the Rules Enabling Act,
Congress ordered that, in matters of ‘practice and procedure,’ the Federal Rules shall govern,
and ‘[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect . . . .’”) (citation
omitted).
26

Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1105 (2002).
27

Id. at 1107 (citation omitted).
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amendments to the Federal Rules proceed through the Advisory Committee, the
Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court, and if approved
by these entities, amendments become effective unless Congress acts to prevent
them.28 Therefore, the process to amend a Rule has changed dramatically since the
implementation of Federal Rule 21, and it now involves more than simple Supreme
Court approval.
C. Modern Federal Rule 21
The plain language of Federal Rule 21 is clear. Federal Rule 21 is entitled
Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of Parties, and it states: “Misjoinder of parties is not a
ground for dismissing an action. On motion or on its own, the court may at any time,
on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a
party.”29 By its title and plain language, Federal Rule 21 applies when parties are
misjoined or nonjoined; here, the court may add a party, drop a party, or sever
claims, if these actions are just. Such a reading is consistent with Federal Rule 21’s
historical ancestors.30 The historical purpose of Federal Rule 21 coincides with the
plain language of the Rule itself.
Federal Rule 21 is a derivative of the English rules of procedure in practice at the
time the American Federal Rules became effective.31 One purpose of the Rule is to
“promote liberal joinder of parties.”32 In 1940, Judge Kalodner wrote that “Rule[] . .
. 21 . . . evidence[s] the general purpose . . . to eliminate the old restrictive and
inflexible rules of joinder designed for a day when formalism was the vogue and to
allow joinder of interested parties liberally to the end that an unnecessary
multiplicity of actions thus might be avoided.”33 In 1958, the Second Circuit
explained the purpose of Federal Rule 21 as an “obviat[ion of] the harsh common
law adherence to the technical rules of joinder and not in order to deal with problems
of defective federal jurisdiction.”34 Fairness and efficiency comprised Federal Rule
21’s original intent in handling nonjoined and misjoined parties. To understand this
Note’s context of the misuse of Federal Rule 21, it is first important to understand
the present day situations in which claims or parties are properly joined, when they
are misjoined, and the removal process based on diversity jurisdiction.

28

Id.

29

FED. R. CIV. P. 21.

30

See supra Part II.A.

31

WRIGHT, ET. AL., supra note 8; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 21 advisory committee’s note
(citing English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 16 r. 11).
32

WRIGHT, ET. AL., supra note 8.

33

Soc’y of European Stage Authors & Composers v. WCAU Broad. Co., 1 F.R.D. 264,
266 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
34
Kerr v. Compagnie De Ultramar, 250 F.2d 860, 864 (2d Cir. 1958) (citation omitted).
But see Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. City of White House, 36 F.3d 540, 545-46 (6th Cir. 1994)
(declining to follow Kerr because “most courts have not restricted the application of Rule 21
and continue to apply the rule to retain federal diversity jurisdiction over a case.”) (citation
omitted).
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III. PROCEDURAL CONTEXT: REMOVAL & DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
Removal is not a constitutional power of the federal courts; rather, it is a power
granted to the federal courts by Congress.35 Congress first established the removal
process in 1789 as a means of granting civil suit defendants a level of control over
forum selection.36 A defendant may remove to federal court any civil action that a
plaintiff files against him in state court but over which the federal district court has
original jurisdiction.37 Federal courts have original jurisdiction if the claim fulfills
the elements necessary for either federal question38 or diversity jurisdiction.39 For a
federal court to exercise diversity jurisdiction over an action, no plaintiff can be a
citizen of the same state as any defendant,40 and the amount in controversy must
exceed $75,000.41 Because the existence of original jurisdiction is a requirement of
removal, the court must evaluate the case for diversity jurisdiction at the time in
which the defendant files his notice of removal.42 To properly consider removing a
case, the federal court must thoroughly examine the joinder of all parties.
IV. THE FEDERAL JOINDER RULES & THE MISJOINDER DOCTRINES
Courts have developed two doctrines by which they measure improper joinder.
These two doctrines are: (1) the fraudulent joinder doctrine43 and (2) the procedural
misjoinder doctrine.44 If the court finds a party to be improperly joined, the court
will ignore that party in its determination of whether it has subject matter jurisdiction
over the action.45 A finding of misjoinder, therefore, may confer diversity
jurisdiction upon the court where the face of the complaint shows a lack of complete
diversity.
A. Federal Rule 19: Required Joinder
Federal Rule 19 governs required joinder of parties.46 Subsection (a) governs
when a party is necessary for just adjudication.47 If the party is necessary, but her

35

28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (West 2010).

36

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79.

37

28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a) (West 2010); see also Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423,
430 (1999) (“[A]n action may be removed . . . to federal court only if a federal district court
would have original jurisdiction over the claim in suit.”).
38

28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 2010).

39

28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 2010).

40

See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806) (requiring complete diversity of parties).

41

28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a) (West 2010).

42

See Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l, Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 210 (6th Cir. 2004); Boelens v.
Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1985).
43

See infra Part IV.C.

44

See infra Part IV.D.

45

See, e.g., Jerome-Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, L.L.C., 176 F.3d 904 (6th Cir. 1999).

46

FED. R. CIV. P. 19.
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presence destroys diversity jurisdiction, subsection (b) provides a balancing test to
determine whether the party is indispensable to the action.48 If the party is found to
be dispensable, then the court may continue to hear the case without that party.49 If
the party is indispensable, the court may dismiss the case,50 but it may proceed even
without the required party.51 Dismissal should be “employed only sparingly.”52
Only upon the impossibility of just resolution of the case should the absence of
nondiverse parties terminate an action.53
B. Federal Rule 20: Permissive Joinder
Federal Rule 20 governs when parties may properly permissively join or be
joined to an action.54 Permissively joined parties must have an interest in claims that
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences, and the parties must share a common question of law or fact.55
Generally, this requirement is fulfilled “[if t]here is a substantial logical relationship
between the transactions or occurrences at issue.”56 Once the requirements for

47

Under Federal Rule 19(a), “a party is [necessary] if: (1) complete relief cannot be given
to existing parties in his absence; (2) disposition in his absence may impair his ability to
protect his interest in the controversy; or (3) his absence would expose existing parties to
substantial risk of double or inconsistent obligations.” Safeco Ins. Co. v. City of White House,
36 F.3d 540, 546 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1) & (2)(i)-(ii)).
48

A party is determined to be dispensable or indispensable by weighing the following
factors:
(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might prejudice
that person or the existing parties; (2) the extent to which any prejudice could be
lessened or avoided . . . ; (3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence
would be adequate; and (4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if
the action were dismissed for non-joinder.
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). But see Soberay Mach. & Equip. Co. v. MRF Ltd., Inc., 181 F.3d 759,
765 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[T]here is no prescribed formula for determining whether a party is
indispensable[.]”) (citation omitted).
49

FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).

50

Id.

51

Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 862 (2008) (“The Rule instructs that
nonjoinder even of a required person does not always result in dismissal.”).
52
Teamsters Local Union No. 171 v. Keal Driveaway Co., 173 F.3d 915, 918 (4th Cir.
1999).
53

Jaser v. New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 815 F.2d 240, 242 (2d Cir. 1987).

54

“Persons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if[] any right to relief is asserted
against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and any question of law or
fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2).
55

Jaloy Mfg. Co., v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 736 F.2d 1131, 1133 (6th Cir. 1984).

56

DLX, Inc., v. Reid Brothers Inc., No. 5:09-CV-341-FL, 2010 WL 4496794, at *3
(E.D.N.C. Oct. 28, 2010).
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permissive joinder are met, it is the plaintiff’s option to permissively join the party.57
If the requirements of Federal Rule 20 are not met as to a named defendant, then
joinder is improper.58
C. The Doctrine of Fraudulent Joinder
It is inevitable that plaintiffs will join nondiverse parties in state actions to
prevent the removal of a claim that would otherwise fulfill diversity; they have
attempted to do so for more than a century.59 The fraudulent joinder doctrine focuses
the validity of a claim brought against a non-diverse defendant or on the validity of a
claim between a joined non-diverse plaintiff and the defendant. Although the
standard for finding fraudulent joinder is not uniform,60 the fraudulent joinder
doctrine generally applies when a plaintiff joins either a nondiverse defendant
against whom the plaintiff has no reasonable basis for the claim, or where a
nondiverse co-plaintiff is joined who has no reasonable basis for the claim against
the defendant.61
The right of a defendant to remove a case cannot be trumped by the “fraudulent
joinder of a resident defendant [or non-diverse plaintiff] having no real connection
with the controversy.”62 If a court finds fraudulent joinder, this finding operates as
an exception to the necessity of diversity jurisdiction, and the court may disregard
the improperly joined nondiverse party in considering how to proceed.63 The court
may then utilize Federal Rule 21 to drop the fraudulently joined party and retain
diversity jurisdiction between the diverse parties.64 Here, it cannot be said the court
creates diversity jurisdiction by dropping the fraudulently joined party; rather, it
simply already enjoyed diversity jurisdiction because the plaintiff did not properly
join the nondiverse defendant.
D. The Doctrine of Fraudulent Misjoinder
While the fraudulent joinder doctrine focuses on the validity of the claims
brought against a nondiverse defendant, fraudulent misjoinder focuses on the
57

Applewhite v. Reichhold Chem. Inc., 67 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 1995).

58

Crockett v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 436 F.3d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 2006).

59

E. Farish Percy, Defining the Contours of the Emerging Fraudulent Misjoinder
Doctrine, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569, 620 (2006).
60

For a discussion of the different standards for fraudulent joinder, see id. at 578-79.

61

See Wecker v. Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 183-84 (1906).

62

Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152 (1914).

63

Jerome-Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, L.L.C., 176 F.3d 904 (6th Cir. 1998). It is
important to note that although the term “fraudulent joinder” encompasses actual fraud by
plaintiffs and attorneys, it is a broader term that also includes actions in which plaintiffs hold a
genuine belief that the nondiverse defendant is properly joined. See Rose v. Giomatti, 721 F.
Supp. 906, 914 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (“[T]he term ‘fraudulent joinder’ is a term of art and is not
intended to impugn the integrity of a plaintiff or plaintiff’s counsel.”).
64

See Smith v. Planned Parenthood, 225 F.R.D. 233, 246 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (finding
misjoinder and severing the nondiverse party); Disparate v. Corporate Exec. Bd., 233 F.R.D.
7, 12 (D.D.C. 2004); Hanna v. Gravett, 262 F. Supp. 2d 643, 647 (E.D. Va. 2003); Hines &
Gensler, supra note 1, at 796.
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relationship of the plaintiff’s claims against the diverse defendant to the plaintiff’s
claims against the nondiverse defendant.65 Under this doctrine, neither may a nondiverse co-plaintiff with a valid but unrelated claim against the defendant be joined
to defeat diversity.66 Here, all claims are valid, but the relationships between the
various claims do not meet the necessary requirements for permissive joinder under
Federal Rule 20.67 For two parties to be properly permissively joined, the claims
must “aris[e] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences,” and they must share a common question of law or fact.68 For example,
the court, by applying the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine, may exercise diversity
jurisdiction in removal over a plaintiff’s claim against a diverse defendant by finding
that the claim against the nondiverse defendant is not sufficiently related to the claim
against the diverse defendant. 69 The court can then sever the claims pursuant to
Federal Rule 21.70 Once the court severs the claims, it must remand the claim
against the nondiverse defendant to state court.71
Unlike the doctrine of fraudulent joinder, the doctrine of fraudulent misjoinder
has not been adopted uniformly by federal or circuit courts, and some courts refuse
to recognize the doctrine altogether.72 A court should not proceed to severance
65

See generally Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1996).
Tapscott is often credited as the first case to utilize the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine.
66

Stacey L. Drentlaw, Procedural Misjoinder: A New Avenue to Federal Court?, 2010
A.B.A. SEC. MASS TORTS LITIG. COMM. 3.
67

See supra Part IV.B.

68

FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a).

69

Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1360 (finding “no real connection” between the claims against a
diverse and nondiverse defendant).
70

In re Fosomax Prods. Liab. Litig., 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 57473, at *43-44 (S.D.N.Y.
July 28, 2008) (“Where fraudulent misjoinder is found, courts sever the misjoined party
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, thereby preserving diversity jurisdiction over
the remainder of the action.”); Frankland v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 2:07-cv-1767,
2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 105534, at *9 (W.D. La. July 2, 2008) (“[I]n cases such as this in which
the court is able to determine whether claims are misjoined on the basis of the pleadings, the
court may choose to sever claims on its own initiative, in the interest of judicial efficiency,
and remand only the improperly joined claims, while retaining those claims properly within its
jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added).
71

28 U.S.C.A. § 1447 (West 2010).

72

The Eleventh Circuit adopted the procedural misjoinder doctrine, while the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits have both cited Tapscott favorably without definitively adopting fraudulent
misjoinder. Stacey L. Drentlaw, Procedural Misjoinder: A New Avenue to Federal Court?,
2010 A.B.A. SEC. MASS TORTS LITIG. COMM. 4 (citing Tapscott, 77 F.3d 1353 (adopting the
fraudulent misjoinder doctrine)); In re Benjamin Moore & Co., 318 F.3d 626, 630-31 (5th Cir.
2002) (“[W]ithout detracting from the force of the Tapscott principle that fraudulent
misjoinder of plaintiffs is no more permissible than fraudulent misjoinder of defendants to
circumvent diversity jurisdiction, we do not reach its application in this case.”); California
Dump Truck Owners Ass’n v. Cummins Engine Co., 24 Fed. App’x 727, 729 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“For purposes of discussion we will assume, without deciding, that this circuit would accept
the doctrines of fraudulent and egregious joinder as applied to plaintiffs.”). The Eighth Circuit
has declined to adopt or reject the doctrine. In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613,
622 (8th Cir. 2010) (“We make no judgment on the propriety of the [fraudulent misjoinder]
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under Federal Rule 21 without first finding fraudulent joinder or misjoinder. To
understand how district courts have arrived at improperly utilizing Federal Rule 21,
it is first important to understand the Supreme Court’s Newman-Green v. Alfonzo
Larrain decision, on which a number of these district courts rely.73
V. THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM
A. Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain 74
The issue presented in Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain was whether a
non-diverse defendant that spoils diversity jurisdiction could be dropped from an
action thus allowing the federal court to retain jurisdiction over the remainder of the
action.75 Newman-Green, an Illinois corporation, alleged failure to pay contractual
royalties and filed suit against a Venezuelan corporation and five individuals.76 The
trial court proceeded to the merits and granted summary judgment for the
defendants, and Newman-Green appealed.77
At a Seventh Circuit panel hearing, the court questioned whether the district
court had established jurisdiction to proceed to the merits of the case because one
defendant was “stateless.”78 Under the statutory jurisdiction invoked by the plaintiff,
jurisdiction exists when a citizen of one state sues a citizen of a foreign country and
a citizen of a state diverse from the plaintiff’s state.79 Bettison, one of the named
defendants, was a citizen of the United States, but was domiciled in Venezuela,80 and
the other four individual defendants were citizens of Venezuela.81 Bettison was
neither a citizen of Venezuela, nor was he a citizen of any state; therefore, the
plaintiff did not meet the statutory qualifications for jurisdiction. The Seventh
Circuit panel, finding a lack of jurisdiction, then held that Federal Rule 21 conferred
upon them the power to dismiss Bettison as a dispensable party, thereby perfecting
the court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).82
doctrine in this case, and decline to either adopt or reject it at this time.”). The Supreme Court
has not yet heard the issue.
This Note proceeds under the notion that the doctrine of misjoinder, when adopted by a
federal court, is an appropriate means of activating Rule 21’s severance power. Whether the
doctrine of misjoinder is itself an appropriate or efficient use of judicial power is beyond the
scope of this Note. For further discussion on the propriety of the doctrine of misjoinder, see
generally, Hines & Gensler, supra note 1 and Percy, supra note 59.
73

Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826 (1989).

74

Id.

75

See generally id.

76

Id. at 828.

77

Id.

78

Id.

79

28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)(3) (West 2010).

80

Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 828.

81

Id.

82

Id. at 829.
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The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, however, came to a different conclusion,
and reversed that decision.83 Judge Posner wrote that Federal Rule 21 does not
“empower[] appellate courts to dismiss a dispensable party whose presence spoils
statutory diversity jurisdiction.”84 The Seventh Circuit, however, believed that as the
Federal Rules apply to district courts, the district court could dismiss Bettison, and it
remanded the case for that court to consider dropping him.85
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict of whether an
appellate court could “dismiss jurisdictional spoilers like Bettison.”86 The Supreme
Court then reversed the en banc Seventh Circuit opinion and held that appellate
courts have the power to dismiss dispensable non-diverse parties from an action.87 It
is important, however, to observe what the Court did not hold in Newman-Green.
The Court declined to decide in a definitive manner whether Federal Rule 21 grants
district courts the power to confer jurisdiction retroactively by dismissing a nondiverse party.88 The Court, instead, stated that it is “well-settled that Rule 21 invests
district courts with authority to allow a dispensable nondiverse party to be dropped
at any time, even after judgment has been rendered.”89
This reasoning is circular. The Court cites one interpretation of Federal Rule 21
by only some inferior federal courts as determinative.90 But widespread misuse of a
Federal Rule by lower courts may hardly be “well-settled.” Indeed, if anything is
well-settled, it is that circuit courts and district courts are inferior to the Supreme
Court, and the Supreme Court could have specifically held that Federal Rule 21
grants this power to a district court if it deemed such a holding appropriate. Instead,
the circular reasoning of the Court represents that this power is well-settled not
because Federal Rule 21 itself confers this power, but because a number of courts
have previously exercised this power.
As Justice Kennedy’s dissent notes, however, “it has never been the rule that
federal courts, whose jurisdiction is created and limited by statute, acquire power by
adverse possession.”91 Further, the dissent recognizes that Federal Rule 21 governs
83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 830.

86

Id.

87

Id. at 837. Dicta, however, placed restrictions upon such a ruling. See id. at 837-38.

88

Id. at 839 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In refusing to explicitly hold that Federal Rule 21
grants this power, the majority wrote, “[a]lmost every modern Court of Appeals faced with
this issue has concluded that it has the authority to dismiss a dispensable nondiverse party by
virtue of Rule 21. . . . [W]e are reluctant to disturb this well-settled judicial construction . . . .”
Id. at 833 (majority opinion).
89

Id. at 832 (majority opinion).

90

Id. at 832, n.6; see also Fritz v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 751 F.2d 1152, 1154-55 (11th
Cir. 1985); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Roman Ceramics Corp., 603 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (3rd Cir.
1979); Caperton v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 585 F.2d 683, 691-92 (4th Cir. 1978).
91
Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 839 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). The
doctrine of adverse possession provides that one who exercises open and notorious,
continuous, exclusive, and adverse dominion and control over a property legally owned by
another for a jurisdictionally determined period of time, will have a valid legal claim to
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misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties, neither of which was present in this case.92 It is
no coincidence, then, that the majority’s citation of Federal Rule 21 omits the rule’s
qualifying title.93
B. The Sins of the Father: The Progeny Problems
For a time after Newman-Green, the federal courts largely did not sever parties
without a misjoinder analysis, but in more recent years, the federal courts have taken
the holding to a new level. In 2009, plaintiff Anthony DeGidio brought suit in Ohio
state court for products liability and medical malpractice against three drug
companies and two individuals respectively for injuries allegedly caused by a
prescription drug.94 The three companies’ principal places of business95 were in
states diverse from Ohio, while a doctor, one of the individual defendants was a
citizen of Ohio.96 The drug company defendants, without the participation of the
individual defendants, removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction.97 DeGidio then filed a motion to remand the action to state court.98 The
federal court acknowledged that complete diversity did not exist on the face of the
complaint since both DeGidio and the defendant doctor were citizens of the state of
Ohio.99
The drug company defendants asserted three theories for why diversity
jurisdiction had nonetheless been fulfilled: 1) the federal court’s power to sever
dispensable parties under Federal Rule 21; 2) the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine; and
ownership rights of that property. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 124-29 (6th ed. 2006).
The metaphor suggests that the Court’s majority has recognized a power so exercised by the
lower courts as valid, not because the lower court followed the Federal Rules, but because of
the manner in which it inconsistently exercised a power not granted therein.
92

Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 839 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

93

Id. at 832 (majority opinion). The Court’s citation states that “[p]arties may be dropped
or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of
the action and on such terms as are just.” Id. The Court did not include the title of Federal
Rule 21, “Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of Parties.” FED. R. CIV. P. 21.
94

DeGidio v. Centocor, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-721, 2009 WL 1867676, at *1 (N.D. Ohio June
29, 2009).
95
In 2010, the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of “principal place of business.” See
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010).

And we conclude that the phrase “principal place of business” refers to the place
where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the
corporation’s activities. Lower federal courts have often metaphorically called that
place the corporation’s “nerve center.” We believe that the “nerve center” will
typically be found at a corporation’s headquarters.
Id. at 1186.
96

DeGidio, 2009 WL 1867676, at *3. The citizenship of the second individual, a nurse,
was unknown. Id.
97

Id. at *1.

98

Id. at *3.

99

Id. at *4.
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3) the fraudulent joinder doctrine.100 Without any initial examination of either
fraudulent joinder or fraudulent misjoinder, the court cited Newman-Green to simply
assert that “under Rule 21 . . . [it could] retain jurisdiction by severing claims against
nondiverse dispensable defendants.”101
Whether a party is properly joined and whether it is dispensable, however, are
two very different analyses. While refusing to overtly apply the fraudulent
misjoinder doctrine, DeGidio nonetheless reasoned that the drug company
defendants were “not necessary” because the medical malpractice claims against the
individuals involved “different legal standards and different factual allegations” than
the product liability claim against the companies.102 This standard is analogous to
the Federal Rule 20 misjoinder analysis because the court reasoned that while all the
claims were valid, they did not arise from the same transaction or occurrence.103 The
court, however, proceeded to an analysis of whether the drug companies were
“necessary” or “indispensable” under Federal Rule 19.104 Federal Rule 19 governs
required joinder, however, and DeGidio exercised his right to permissively join the
drug companies under the state joinder rule analogous to Federal Rule 20. The
implication, then, in such an examination of whether the party is “indispensable”
under Federal Rule 19, is that permissively joined parties in state court are likely
dispensable parties in federal court. Under this assumption, permissively joined
parties in state court actions would often be severable by discretion under Federal
Rule 21 when a defendant seeks to remove the case to federal court.
DeGidio and similar cases105 are also distinguishable from Newman-Green on
other grounds. First, Newman-Green did not involve removal from state to federal
court.106 The process of removal involves important concerns regarding federalism
which are not present in actions filed originally in federal court.107 Second, plaintiff
Newman-Green did not object to the dropping of Bettison, the nondiverse defendant,
which indicates that the plaintiff may not have suffered prejudice under such an
action. Third, the Newman-Green Court warned that inferior courts should
“carefully consider whether the dismissal of a nondiverse party will prejudice any of
the parties in the litigation.”108 Fourth, the Court warned that the power to dismiss a
100

Id.

101

Id. at *4.

102

Id. at *3.

103

FED. R. CIV. P. 20. This is not, however, a perfect analogy because under FED. R. CIV. P.
20(a)(2)(B), “[p]ersons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if [] any question of law
or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” In DeGidio, there is at least one
issue of fact common to both the drug company defendants and the individual defendants—
whether the prescription drug was indeed defective. Therefore, a Rule 20 analysis for
misjoinder might result in finding that the parties were properly permissively joined, thus
negating severance under Federal Rule 21.
104

DeGidio, 2009 WL 1867676.

105

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

106

See generally Newman-Green v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826 (1989).

107

DeGidio, 2009 WL 1867676, at *3.

108

Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 838.
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dispensable nondiverse party should be “exercised sparingly.”109 Fifth, the Court
warned against abuse, stating that it was “reluctant to disturb [the power to dismiss
dispensable nondiverse parties] . . . particularly when there is no evidence that this
authority has been abused . . . by district courts . . . .”110 Sixth, the Court noted that
the failure to drop the defendant would have resulted in a waste of time and judicial
resources.111
VI. THE PROBLEMS EXPOUNDED
A. No Outlet: The Limits of Inherent Power
Since the language of Federal Rule 21 clearly applies only to misjoined and
nonjoined parties, from what source does this power to proceed past jurisdictional
satisfaction to sever parties flow? As the dissent in Newman-Green points out, we
are in a modern procedural era where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Title
28 provisions, not the common law, govern the procedure and jurisdiction of the
federal district courts.112 The majority, however, cites to two cases from the 1800s
for support, a time in which the modern Federal Rules did not exist.
The
first
case the Court cites is Carneal v. Banks,113 but this case does not support the notion
that a court may drop properly joined parties. In Carneal, Chief Justice Marshall
wrote “[t]hat they have been improperly made defendants in his bill, cannot affect
the jurisdiction of the Court as between those parties who are properly before it.”114
Such a finding of improperly joined parties would justify the present day use of
Federal Rule 21 to sever misjoined parties under either the fraudulent joinder or
fraudulent misjoinder doctrines.115
The second case the Newman-Green Court cites is more supportive of dropping a
misjoined party to retain jurisdiction, but it proceeds from an argument of inherent
power. In Horn v. Lockhart,116 the Court reasoned, “the question always is . . .
whether . . . [nondiverse parties] are indispensable parties, for if their interests are
severable and a decree without prejudice to their rights can be made, the jurisdiction
of the court should be retained and the suit dismissed as to them.”117 Although
supportive of the majority’s proposition, the language “should be retained” indicates
only that the Lockhart Court believed that it had discretion under its inherent power
to dismiss a nondiverse and dispensable party. In present day, however, although the
Federal Rules appropriately allow judges wide latitude of discretion, the power to

109

Id. at 837.

110

Id. at 833 (emphasis added).

111

Id. at 838.

112

Id. at 842 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

113

Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. 181 (1825).

114

Id. at 188 (emphasis added).

115

See supra Parts IV.C-D.

116

Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. 570 (1873).

117

Id. at 579.
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dismiss properly joined parties to retroactively create jurisdiction for removal is not
discretionary; it is imaginary.118
While the use of judicial inherent power has a long history in the procedural
scheme, no clarity exists as to the exact nature of a court’s inherent power.119 Since
the implementation of the modern scheme of creating federal rules, courts have been
vague in articulating the delineation between and the coexistence of inherent power
and the rules of procedure.120 Federal Rules of procedure, however, should at least
temper a court’s inherent power. If a federal court maintains unlimited inherent
power even where relevant procedural rules exist, this could render procedural rules
meaningless. Any exercise of inherent power should extend only to those areas that
the rules do not address, and a court should not claim inherent power to change the
history, purpose, and plain language of a federal rule.
The Newman-Green Court proceeded under the assumption that the power to
sever lies somewhere beyond what is plainly sanctioned within the Federal Rules
themselves, and in so doing, the Court substituted the rule amendment process with
its inherent power. By judicial decree, the Supreme Court sanctioned the use of
Federal Rule 21, with caveats, to drop properly joined parties despite the Rule’s
purpose. If the Court can exercise its inherent power to change the operation of a
federal rule, then it has circumvented Congress’ intended mechanism for a multilayered rule-creation process121 and the systematic checks and balances that such a
framework provides.
Alternatively, some federal courts have held that they have inherent power to
perfect jurisdiction by dropping a nondiverse defendant where the plaintiff is
amenable to the option.122 But where a plaintiff is amenable to dismissing a
nondiverse defendant, this is not an exercise of “inherent power;” the court simply
bypasses the plaintiff’s need to file a motion to voluntarily dismiss the nondiverse

118

See Percy, supra note 59, at 620 (“Newman-Green does not support the proposition that
district courts may use Rule 21 to dismiss properly joined dispensable parties in order to
create removal jurisdiction.”).
119

Samuel P. Jordan, Situating Inherent Power Within a Rules Regime, 87 DENV. U. L.
REV. 311, 312 (2010).
120

Id. Professor Samuel P. Jordan places a court’s inherent power into two categories: 1)
gap-fillers; and 2) escape valves. Id. at 313-16. Gap-filling inherent powers “permit courts to
use their inherent power to fill gaps left by an existing but incomplete procedural framework.”
Id. at 313. Escape valve inherent power is “used as an alternative source of authority in
situations where a more formal procedure also applies . . . to circumvent the answer provided
by a competing source of authority.” Id. at 315. Such a use of inherent power as an escape
valve flouts the rule-creation process and frustrates litigants’ expectations. Id.
121

Id. at Part I.B.3.

122

Neeld v. Am. Hockey League, 439 F. Supp. 459, 462 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (“It has long
been established . . . that a federal court, on plaintiff’s motion, may drop a non-diverse
defendant and retain jurisdiction if that party is [dispensable]. Although plaintiff has not made
a motion to dismiss the state claim . . . this court has inherent power to perfect its jurisdiction
and it would be needlessly ritualistic to require plaintiff to make such a motion prior to
dismissing the state claim.”) (citing Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. 570 (1873)) (emphasis added);
see also Planning and Investing Co. v. Hemlock, 50 F.R.D. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Karakatsanis
v. Conquestador Cia. Nav., S.A., 247 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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defendant.123
These courts simply recognize the efficiency of bypassing the
ritualism of requiring the plaintiff to first file a motion to dismiss where the court is
aware that if given the chance, the plaintiff would have filed a motion to voluntarily
dismiss the claim against the nondiverse party.124 An argument of inherent power
here is misleading. This exercise of discretion is merely a preemptive strike to
promote efficiency and not an exercise of an inherent jurisdiction-perfecting power.
The failure of the Newman-Green Court to specifically hold that Federal Rule 21
itself empowers a district court to sever a properly joined nondiverse dispensable
party represents a calculated hesitation by the majority. The Court probably
understood that the title and text of Federal Rule 21 did not support its holding, and
this is likely the reason that the Supreme Court referred to the use of this tactic as
“well-settled” by the lower courts rather than affirmatively asserting that Federal
Rule 21 grants this power.125
B. Suspending Jurisdiction: Bypassing Complete Diversity
Removal requires complete diversity.126 The doctrines of fraudulent joinder and,
to a somewhat lesser extent, fraudulent misjoinder, have provided successful
rationales for a court to drop improperly joined parties under Federal Rule 21 before
finding complete diversity and proceeding to the merits of an action. Because
Congress has approved Federal Rules 19, 20 and 21, this judicial exercise is within
the bounds of the power of the federal courts. When, however, a federal court
proceeds to severance under Federal Rule 21 without a finding of any recognized
class of misjoinder, it takes action which is improper because complete diversity
does not exist, and the court therefore has no power to act.127 Indeed, to take such an
action, the court must first suspend the requirement for complete diversity under

123

Neeld, 439 F. Supp. at 462.

124

Id.; see also Percy, supra note 59, at 619-20 (“Newman-Green [is] binding precedent to
support [federal court] use of Rule 21 to create jurisdiction retroactively in cases originally
filed in federal court where the plaintiff has no objection to the dismissal of the [nondiverse
defendant] and where dismissal for lack of jurisdiction would waste judicial resources.”)
(emphasis added).
125

See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.

126

Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996) (“The current general-diversity statute
. . . applies only [where] the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of each
defendant.”); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (“[D]iversity
jurisdiction does not exist unless each defendant is a citizen of a different State from each
plaintiff”); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S 267 (1806).
127

Shannon v. Mejias, No. 06-1191-MLB, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 80793, at *15-16 (E.D.
Kan. Nov. 3, 2006) (refusing to sever because the court must first have jurisdiction to consider
severance); Melton v. Merck & Co., No. 7:06-45-JMH, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 37376, at *14
(E.D. Ky. June 1, 2006) (“With no support for alleging misjoinder under Rule 20, [the]
argument that Rules 19 and 21 can be employed after removal to create complete diversity and
avoid remand is without merit.”); Gonzalez v. J.C. Penny Corp., Inc., No. 05-22254, 2005
U.S. Dist. Lexis 44840, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2005) (“Until and unless a situation arises in
which there exists complete diversity of citizenship, this court may not sever claims, it may
not dismiss parties, it may do nothing but remand this action . . . .”).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012

17

266

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:249

both sections 1332 and 1441(a), and it must act in spite of this requirement.128 This
use of Federal Rule 21, then, circumvents the statutes that Congress has passed to
regulate the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts. Indeed, it is a temporary exercise
of diversity jurisdiction where none exists.129
C. Stealing Jurisdiction: The Concern for Federalism
There are two levels on which a federal court severance of properly joined
nondiverse parties improperly ignores the state court system. The first level
concerns the application of the Federal Rules instead of state rules to find
misjoinder.130 Most federal courts utilize the state joinder rule, while some utilize
the federal joinder rule to evaluate fraudulent misjoinder.131 In many states, the
corresponding rule is identical or similar to the Federal Rule so that same result will
occur, but in other states the rule is different and the court could come to a different
result in applying that standard.132 In this instance, an application of the federal rule
ignores the state’s authority to formulate and enforce its own joinder rules.133 The
state may utilize its own joinder rules to find that no nondiverse party was
improperly joined. If the plaintiff properly joined a nondiverse defendant in state
court, but the federal court measures misjoinder by the Federal Rules, then a federal
court must ignore the plaintiff’s state court procedural rights.
The second level of federal dominance concerns the use of Federal Rule 21 to
sever parties where the federal court does not find, or it claims that it need not at all
examine misjoinder.134 Where there is no finding of misjoinder, the federal court, by
carving up an action that may have been properly joined in a state court into separate
actions, seizes a case from the jurisdiction of the state court with no regard for the
operation of the state court.135 Moreover, even cases that employ Federal Rule 21 in
128
Hines & Gensler, supra note 1, at 797; see also Shannon v. Mejias, No. 06-1191-MLB,
2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 80793, at *16 (E.D. Kan. Nov. 3, 2006) (“A court simply cannot create
diversity jurisdiction by carving out the non-diverse parties in a case removed from the state
system.”).
129
See Shannon, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 90793, at *16 (finding that using Rule 21 to sever
actions originally brought in federal court is distinct from cases that are removed to federal
court from state court); see also Hines & Gensler, supra note 1, at 797.
130
There is controversy surrounding which standard to apply. For further reading, see
Percy, supra note 59, at 590.
131

Id. at 591.

132

Hines & Gensler, supra note 1, at 812.

133

See Percy supra, note 59, at Part V.A.

134

DeGidio v. Centocor, Inc., No. 3:09CV721, 2009 WL 1867676, at *4 (N.D. Ohio June
29, 2009) (stating that because Federal Rule 21 allows the court the power to drop dispensable
parties, it need not examine whether diversity jurisdiction exists under an analysis of
fraudulent joinder or misjoinder).
135
Cassens v. Cassens, 430 F. Supp. 2d 830, 838 n.4 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (conceding that there
is authority to support dropping parties to preserve jurisdiction in actions brought originally to
the federal court, but stating “the Court is not aware of any controlling authority authorizing
the use of Rule 21 to permit a federal court to exercise jurisdiction in a removed case over the
objections of a plaintiff.”).
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this manner acknowledge that the principles of federalism require that the removal
statute be strictly construed, and that any doubts should be resolved against removal
from the state court system.136
By acknowledging the federalism concerns raised by removal and nevertheless
severing nondiverse properly joined parties, some federal courts have decided that
there is no doubt about the propriety of their use of Federal Rule 21 and that this use
does not interfere with state jurisdiction. A federal court, however, acting without
jurisdiction to take an action which the state otherwise would have the power to
adjudicate, deprives the state court of its jurisdiction. Not only does severance under
these circumstances infringe upon state authority, but it conflicts with other
provisions in the Federal Rules themselves.
D. Federal Rule 82
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82 states that “[t]hese rules do not extend or
limit the jurisdiction of the district courts or the venue of actions in those courts.”137
The Federal Rules should not be construed in such a manner to extend the district
court’s subject matter jurisdiction.138 In his Newman-Green dissent, Justice Kennedy
wrote that “[s]ince dismissing a nondiverse party confers jurisdiction retroactively
on the district court, it is questionable whether relying on Federal Rule 21 is
consistent with Federal Rule 82’s clear admonition.”139 While dropping an
improperly joined party would arguably not violate Federal Rule 82,140 dropping a
properly joined nondiverse party would violate this rule because, here, the court acts
without subject matter jurisdiction to create subject matter jurisdiction.141

136
Thomas v. Bank of Am. Corp., 570 F.3d 1280, 1282 n.4 (11th Cir. 2009); Adventure
Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2008); Queen ex rel. Province of
Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 339 (6th Cir. 1989).
137

FED. R. CIV. P. 82.

138

Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 840 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (“It must be remembered . . . that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82 expressly
provides that the other Rules must not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
district courts.”); see also Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 664 (1996); Cantanella
v. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2005); Easter v. Am. W. Fin., 381 F.3d 948, 963
(9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Eleven Vehicles, Their Equip. and Accessories, 200 F.3d
203, 216 (3d Cir. 2000).
139

Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 840 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

140

But see Palermo v. Letourneau Techs., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 499, 517 (S.D. Miss. 2008)
(“[A] district court may run afoul of Rule 82 if it uses a federal rule to determine if the
plaintiff’s claims were properly joined under state law at the time of removal.”); Percy, supra
note 59, at 595 (applying federal joinder rules instead of state joinder rules to determine
misjoinder may violate Rule 82).
141

Gonzalez v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. 05-22254, 2005 U.S. Lexis 44840, at *6 (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 7, 2005) (“Using Rule 21 in [this] manner . . . would allow a district court to ‘create’
jurisdiction on removal simply by dismissing nondiverse, dispensable [parties] . . . .”) (citation
omitted).
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E. Federal Rule 1 and Undue Hardship on Plaintiffs
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 states that the Federal Rules “should be
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding.”142 The district courts have an affirmative duty to
utilize procedure to ensure a fair resolution of matters without excessive cost or
delay.143 When a federal court utilizes Federal Rule 21 to sever a properly joined
dispensable nondiverse party, the court runs the risk of violating Federal Rule 1.144
Upon severing, the court will either dismiss without prejudice145 or remand the
nondiverse party to state court. Subdividing a case into multiple actions where they
arise from the same transaction or occurrence,146 however, may frustrate Federal
Rule 1 by requiring the inefficiency of separate cases — one in federal court and one
in state court.147 Moreover, even Newman-Green recognizes that such a use of
Federal Rule 21 might prejudice parties to the litigation.148
Courts have found severance to be improper where the severance causes
prejudice or delay, produces judicial inefficiency, or precipitates fundamental
unfairness.149 Some courts, however, have recently reasoned that the creation of
multiple actions by severing a nondiverse party does not produce results egregious
enough to violate the Federal Rule 1 mandate of efficient, cost-effective

142

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.

143

Johnson v. Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs of Fremont, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1230 (D. Colo. 1994)
(noting that even if the parties themselves do not raise objections, the courts themselves are
obligated to consider the goals of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1).
144

Baker v. Tri-Nations Express, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1318 (M.D. Ala. 2008)
(“[A]ny Rule 21 discretion to dismiss parties and sever claims to ‘create’ jurisdiction does not
extend to the instant situation and requested action, nor does it promote judicial economy
where all of the claims arise out of one accident.”).
145
A dismissal “without prejudice” leaves the plaintiff with the opportunity to re-file its
complaint against the nondiverse dispensable party in another action. Semtek Int’l Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505 (2001).
146

FED. R. CIV. P. 20.

147

See e.g., Garcia v. Sandoz Inc., No. CV-10-87, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 42505, at * 11
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2010); Ash v. Providence Hosp., No. 08-0525-WS-M, 2009 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 12794, at *43 (S.D. Ala. 2009); Baker v. Tri-Nations Express, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d
1307, 1318 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (“[A]ny Rule 21 discretion to dismiss parties and sever claims to
‘create’ jurisdiction does not extend to the instant situation and requested action, nor does it
promote judicial economy where all of the claims arise out of one accident.”).
148

Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 837-38 (1989).

149

See id.; Garcia, No. CV-10-87 at * 11 (“A Court may determine that severance is
improper if severance would cause prejudice and delay, decrease judicial economy, or fail to
the [sic] safeguard principals of fundamental fairness.” ); see also Acevedo v. Allsup’s
Convenience Stores, Inc., 600 F.3d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Coleman v. Quaker Oats
Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th Cir 2000)); Applewhite v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 67 F.3d
571, 574 n.12 (5th Cir. 1995); Morris v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 37 F. Supp. 2d 556, 581
(E.D.N.Y. 1999).
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procedure.150 Other courts have failed to even address the inefficiencies produced by
severance and have instead relied upon the fact that the plaintiff still has a remedy
against the dismissed or remanded nondiverse party in state court.151 These
decisions implicitly indicate compliance with Federal Rule 1. Whether a plaintiff
still has a remedy against the severed party, however, does not sufficiently address
the mandates of Federal Rule 1. The plaintiff is ultimately prejudiced in relation to
the cost and inefficiency inevitably produced by the necessity of maintaining two
related actions in separate forums.
VII. THE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure represent the full and complete
procedural options available to federal district courts or they do not. If they do not
represent complete procedural power, and the federal courts wield too vast inherent
power beyond the rules themselves, then the level of predictability or uniformity in
the federal legal system is jeopardized. At any time, a court might cite a nineteenth
century case for its procedural analysis in an attempt to circumvent the Federal Rules
and to give a federal district court the option of rediscovering an “inherent power.”
Federal Rule 21 is either limited to misjoined parties as its plain language suggests,
or it is not.
There are two possible branches of government that could solve the problems
created by the Supreme Court’s ambiguous statement that the use of Federal Rule 21
to drop dispensable properly joined parties is “well-settled” by the district courts
while failing to hold whether Federal Rule 21 itself actually grants this power to the
district courts.152 The judicial branch itself could rectify its own ambiguity by the
exercise of judicial restraint by amending the current Federal Rule 21, or by
following the procedures established to add a new federal rule to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Changing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, is a
combined approach, since congressional approval would be required. While a
judicial branch solution is ideal, congressional action could also solve the problem.
If the federal courts continue to ignore the plain language and purpose of Federal
Rule 21, Congress should simply exercise its power to amend the grant of diversity
jurisdiction to exclude this misuse of Federal Rule 21. Alternatively, Congress
should amend the removal statute to define “properly joined” parties.
A. A Restrained Approach from the Bench
First, a federal court should limit its exercise of Federal Rule 21 to sever
nondiverse parties in removal actions only when they are improperly joined under
either a finding of fraudulent joinder153 or fraudulent misjoinder.154 If the district
150
DeGidio v. Centocor, Inc., No. 3:09CV721, 2009 WL 1867676, at *4 (N.D. Ohio June
29, 2009) (“While fighting on two fronts will no doubt be inconvenient, and probably more
expensive, I do not find the maintenance of two lawsuits unfairly or unduly prejudicial.”).
151

See Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand at 7, Williams v. Knoll Pharm. Co.,
No. 5:03-CV-8030-JG (N.D. Ohio July 11th, 2003) (PACER) (“Further, the . . . plaintiffs have
an adequate remedy if the Court drops the nondiverse Physician Defendants because the . . .
plaintiffs can proceed with their claims against the . . . Defendants in state court.”).
152

See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.

153

See supra Part IV.C.
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court has not adopted the doctrine of fraudulent misjoinder, it should do so before
exercising Federal Rule 21 to sever improperly joined parties where the requirements
of Federal Rule 20 are not met. However, in the event that a federal court turns to
Newman-Green, it should limit this precedent to its unique set of facts. There, the
Court recognized the use of Federal Rule 21 to drop a dispensable nondiverse party
to create diversity jurisdiction but only where the action was originally brought in
federal court, where the plaintiff was amenable to the severance, where there existed
no prejudice to the parties, and where no waste of judicial resources would occur.155
Moreover, the Court warned that such a procedure should be used only rarely.156
Removal actions differ from cases originally brought in federal court. A federal
court should consider the principles of federalism when deciding whether to take
jurisdiction from a case originally filed in state court.157 The principles of federalism
require the court to resolve any ambiguities or doubts in favor of remand.158 A
federal court, therefore, should respect the independent power of the state court to
hear a case properly brought before it without manipulating the party lineup in a
manner that overrides state court jurisdiction. Utilizing Federal Rule 21 to sever
parties only upon a finding of misjoinder not only properly balances the right of the
plaintiff to choose a state court forum and the statutory right of the defendant to
remove an improperly joined case to federal court, but it also respects the plain
language of Federal Rule 21 and the spirit of its historical predecessors.
A court should not exercise its inherent power to change the fundamental
purpose of Federal Rule 21 as a substitute for the rule amendment process.
Proponents of vast judicial discretion might reject the idea of a more narrow use of
inherent power, even where existing Federal Rules regulate a procedure such as
joinder.159 In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., the Supreme Court asserted that federal
courts necessarily enjoy a level of implied powers “which cannot be dispensed
with.”160 One might argue that this inherent power of the federal courts allows for
liberal interpretation of procedural rules. For dropping properly joined parties,
however, the Supreme Court has tied its perceived inherent power to Federal Rule 21
itself.161 In this sense, the Court has not simply asserted an inherent power beyond
the Rules, but has utilized its inherent power to change the meaning of a
promulgated Rule.
154

See supra Part IV.D.

155

Percy, supra note 59, at 619-20.

156

Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 837 (1989) (“Although we hold
that the courts of appeals have the authority to dismiss a dispensable nondiverse party, we
emphasize that such authority should be exercised sparingly.”).
157

See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986); Franchise Tax
Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
158

Cheshire v. Coca-Cola Bottling Affiliated, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 (D.S.C. 1990).

159

Struve, supra note 26, at 1130.

160

Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (citation omitted).

161

In Newman-Green, the Court cited two cases from the 1800s pre-dating the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as support for an inherent power to drop properly joined parties, but
then brought this inherent power into the interpretation of Federal Rule 21 despite the Rule’s
plain language and historical purpose. See supra Part VI.A.
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Instead of claiming inherent power, federal courts should first utilize Federal
Rules 19, 20, and 21 to regulate joinder. While federal courts do enjoy an
undetermined level of inherent procedural power,162 the court should not over
emphasize its inherent power where the rules creation process has produced a
procedural rule or several procedural rules together to regulate a procedure such as
joinder of parties. If the inherent power of the court is not at least tempered where
formal rules exist, then procedural rules themselves, as well as the process that
produces them, become meaningless. For these reasons, a court should rely upon the
history and purpose of Federal Rule 21 to restrict its application to the severance of
only misjoined parties.
B. Follow Procedure: Amend the Federal Rules
Instead of exercising Federal Rule 21 in a manner inconsistent with its mandate,
the federal courts should seek to amend Federal Rule 21 itself, or they should seek to
create a new federal rule by splitting Federal Rule 21 into two separate rules. Since
such a process would entail approval by Congress,163 and because the Constitution
ultimately vests Congress with the power to establish inferior federal courts,164
following this process would preserve the constitutional intent for Congress to
regulate the federal courts. The rules creation process as established by Congress
should be preserved and followed.
In its present form, Federal Rule 21 is entitled “Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of
Parties” and expressly provides that “[m]isjoinder of parties is not a ground for
dismissing an action. On motion, or on its own, the court may at any time, on just
terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.”165
If, as the title suggests, the federal courts wish to expand the scope of Federal Rule
21 beyond misjoined parties, a proposed rule should expressly indicate such an
expansion, and Congress should be given the opportunity to weigh the consequences
of such a rule.166 Following the rules creation process ensures a multi-layered review
of a proposal before its implementation, as intended by Congress.167
Alternatively, a new severance rule, wholly separate from Federal Rule 21,
should be introduced to encompass the recent declaration of some federal district
courts that they have the power to sever nondiverse dispensable parties in order
create diversity jurisdiction whenever they deem appropriate. Such a rule, however,
would still conflict with the mandate of Federal Rule 82 that the Federal Rules do

162

Jordan, supra note 119, at 312.

163

See supra text and accompanying notes 21-24.

164

U.S. CONST. art III, § 1; U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 9.

165

FED. R. CIV. P. 21.

166

Such a rule might still conflict with Federal Rule 82, supra Part VI.D, and with Federal
Rule 1, supra Part VI.E.
167
Struve, supra note 26, at 1140. “Requiring that changes take place through the
rulemaking process – rather than through adjudication – at least increases the chances that
amendments will be subjected to a deliberative process and informed by practical knowledge.
In addition, the structure of the rulemaking process facilitates informed and deliberative
decision making and permits a holistic approach to the revision of the Rules.” Id.
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not “extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts.”168 This solution is
proposed only because it would necessitate congressional action to either grant or to
ultimately deny this “procedural” power to the federal courts. If the judicial branch,
having already asserted such a power, avoids the proper rule amendment process,
congressional remedial action, although unlikely, remains possible.
C. Congressional Action
There is a real possibility in the future that courts will further continue to fracture
on the proper use of Federal Rule 21. If the problem worsens to the point where
uniformity and predictability become severely impaired for plaintiffs, Congress
could take action. In the absence of judicial restraint, Congress should exercise its
authority to regulate the practice and procedure of the federal courts.169 Although
Congress has delegated the bulk of its rule making authority to the judicial branch
through the Rules Enabling Act,170 Congress retains the right to amend or to abridge
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by statute.171 The Federal Rules hold
“presumptive validity,”172 but may still be challenged as inconsistent with the powers
delegated by Congress.173 Here, the problem is not with Federal Rule 21 itself, but
with the evolving interpretation of the Federal Rule. Congress has two options for
amending statutes to curtail the use of Federal Rule 21 by district courts to create
diversity jurisdictions in removal actions by dropping properly joined nondiverse
parties: it can either amend the diversity statute or amend the removal statute.
1. The Broad Approach: Amend 28 U.S.C. § 1332
Should federal courts fail to exercise the proper restraint in their application of
Federal Rule 21, Congress could amend 28 U.S.C. section 1332, its diversity
jurisdiction key to the federal courts. Congress should take a broad approach and
require a finding of misjoinder as a prerequisite to severance under Federal Rule 21
as its text suggests. Such an approach would not only prevent severance without
misjoinder in removal actions, but would abrogate Newman-Green, in that
misjoinder would become a necessary prerequisite even for actions brought
originally to the federal court. The language of 28 U.S.C. section 1441 incorporates
the definition of diversity jurisdiction into section 1332. A broad approach would
require a change to the grant of diversity jurisdiction in section 1332 since section
1441 is dependent upon the definition of section 1332’s jurisdictional grant on
diversity grounds. Under this mechanism, then, Congress would preserve its power
to hold the keys to the jurisdiction of the federal courts under both its statutory grant
of diversity jurisdiction174 and its statutory grant of removal.175
168

FED. R. CIV. P. 82.

169

Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d 132, 134 (5th Cir. 1996); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1, 9-10, 61 (1941); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 21 (1825).
170

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

171

Jackson, 102 F.3d at 134; Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 78 (1958).

172

Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 42 F.3d 948, 950 (5th Cir. 1995).

173

Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946).
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28 U.S.C.A § 1332 (West 2010).

175

28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (West 2010).
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Section 1332 should be amended to expressly state that a district court may not
manipulate an action to create diversity jurisdiction by dropping or severing any
party or claim where the parties have been properly permissively joined in one action
under the same requirements as Federal Rule 20. Such an amendment would limit
the use of Federal Rule 21 to its plain language in that severance would be limited to
only improperly joined parties. This amendment would allow the federal courts to
retain a level of discretion to determine when parties are improperly joined under
Federal Rule 20. Should the state rule of joinder in the rare instance, however,
conflict with Federal Rule 20, the state rule should take precedent over the Federal
Rule.176 This amendment would also eliminate the illogical test of dispensability and
require the courts to adopt the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine if they wish to dismiss
or to sever parties against whom plaintiffs assert insufficiently related claims.
Parties otherwise properly permissively joined under Federal Rule 20 or the state
corollary could not be severed simply to create diversity jurisdiction. Although this
is the better Congressional solution, another narrower approach would remain
available to Congress.
2. The Narrow Approach: Amend 28 U.S.C. § 1441
While section 1441, the removal statute, already contains a requirement that
parties be properly joined to be removed,177 there has been disagreement as to what
joinder analysis to apply.178 Defining “properly joined” within section 1441 to
denote compliance with Federal Rule 20 or its state corollary with an express
assertion that a district court may not manipulate an action to create diversity
jurisdiction by dropping or severing any party or claim where the parties have been
properly permissively joined in one state court action would neuter the improper use
of Federal Rule 21.179 While amending the removal statute alone would not
ultimately affect the current use of Federal Rule 21 to sever nondiverse dispensable
parties to create diversity jurisdictions in actions brought originally in federal court,
it would curtail the same application of Federal Rule 21 to actions removed by
176

See supra Part VI.C.

177

28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(b) (West 2010). No legislative history exists, however, as to the
purpose of the phrase “properly joined and served” within the removal statute. Sullivan v.
Novartis Pharms. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 644 (D.N.J. 2008). Nevertheless, many courts
have determined that the terminology is meant to prevent a plaintiff from gamesmanship
designed to defeat removal by joining a party who the plaintiff does not actually intend to
serve as a party to the action. Id. at 643; see also Stan Winston Creatures, Inc. v. Toys “R”
Us, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 177, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Under a plain language analysis,
however, there may be an argument to be made that the language encompasses fraudulent
joinder of parties.
178
Courts that misuse Federal Rule 21 to sever nondiverse dispensable parties in removal
actions utilize Federal Rule 19 governing required joinder to measure dispensability, and
therefore the only way to be properly joined under this analysis is to be indispensable to the
action. Courts that properly first require a finding of fraudulent misjoinder will utilize Federal
Rule 20 or the comparable state joinder rule to measure whether parties have been properly
permissively joined together in the action.
179
Note, however, that in this amendment Congress should clarify whether the standard for
“properly joined parties” should be measured by Federal Rule 20 or the comparable state
permissive joinder rule. See supra note 130.
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defendants from state to federal court. This solution is appropriate, however, only if
Congress first determines that the current use of Federal Rule 21, as expanded by
Newman-Green, is proper as to actions brought originally in federal court. To curtail
all infractions, however, the better solution is for Congress to take the broad
approach and amend its requirements for diversity jurisdiction under section 1332.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 and its historical ancestors support the
procedural power of a federal court to drop or sever only misjoined claims or parties.
The vague and circular reasoning of Newman-Green has led federal courts to use
Federal Rule 21 to carve up removal actions where parties are properly joined in
state court to create diversity jurisdiction in federal court. Since Congress ultimately
controls the procedure of federal courts and has set up a multi-layered process for
rule creation, a federal court should temper its use of inherent power where that
process has produced sufficient procedural rules. Moreover, this misuse of Federal
Rule 21 not only obstructs the principles of federalism, but it conflicts with other
provisions of the Federal Rules themselves. In the absence of judicial restraint,
Congress should ultimately amend its statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction to
disallow the misuse of Federal Rule 21 to create jurisdiction in removal actions
where there is none.
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